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Introduction 
Following the ILC Report on Fragmentation in International Law (IL), scholars have been 
started to question whether such fragmentation could have affected also its sub-branches, and, 
especially, International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Due to the proliferation of both IHRL 
norms and institutions, especially at the regional level, this appeared a real possibility.  
Judicial fragmentation could be defined as the situation where two courts, seized of the same 
or similar matter, issue contrasting judgments. Adopting this definition, that focuses on the 
outcome of the judgments, judicial fragmentation in IHRL proved to be a limited phenomenon 
since convergence turned out to be predominant.1   
Nevertheless, an interesting result emerges from this analysis; in all instances of judicial 
fragmentation between regional human rights bodies, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is always present. This raises questions on why the judicial behaviour of the ECtHR 
favours fragmentation and whether it is possible to identify some elements that explain the 
presence of the ECtHR in all cases of fragmentation. The incredibly high number of cases 
examined every year by the court and the variety of subject-matters are certainly elements that 
contribute to this, especially considering that the ECtHR has often been the first body to render 
a judgment on a new topic. However, there are many other legal and non-legal factors that 
explain the involvement of the ECtHR in judicial fragmentation. The following examples will 
present some of them. 
1. Indigenous property rights: the absence of judicial dialogue
The case-law of the ECtHR on indigenous property rights offers a good example of judicial 
behaviour that led to fragmentation, especially if compared to the case-law of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).  
1 See, among others, Carla M. Buckley, Alice Donald, Philip Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in International 
Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems (Brill-Nijhoff 2016).   
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The ECtHR ruled on the topic only in two cases, Handölsdalen v Sweden2 and Hingitaq 53 v 
Denmark,3 and in both circumstances the court dismissed the case or found against the 
applicants, ruling completely in contrast with similar cases before the IACtHR. The main 
feature of the ECtHR’s adjudication of indigenous property rights-related cases is the 
application of a private property model to indigenous land claims and the subsequent failure to 
recognise the right to own and use the ancestral land without a formal legal title. Indeed, in 
both rulings the ECtHR fell short of acknowledging the special position reserved to indigenous 
peoples in IHRL, as confirmed by the ILO Convention No.169 and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) and considered them as any normal applicant claiming 
rights over a land for which they did not have any proof of purchase or acquisition.  
Several are the reasons behind such an approach and the subsequent fragmentation triggered 
with the IACtHR. First, the debate on indigenous people’s rights is underdeveloped in Europe 
considering that the neighbouring issue of minorities’ rights has catalysed much of the attention 
for the relevance and number of minorities present in the European region. Second, this lack 
of expertise of the ECtHR on indigenous property rights, also due to the very limited case-law, 
has not been compensated by any judicial dialogue with other regional counterparts. Despite 
the extensive case-law of the IACtHR on the topic, with some cases presenting very similar 
facts to those adjudicated by the ECtHR, the Strasbourg court decided to completely ignore the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR, which could have been extremely useful for better understanding 
the unique position of indigenous people.4 Whilst the ECtHR engaged with a comparative law 
review, it only focused on the case-law of its member states without going outside the European 
region. Lastly, the very low engagement of dedicated NGOs, which are very active in lobbying 
on the IACtHR but almost completely absent before the ECtHR, contributed to this different 
consideration of the issue.  
 
2. The right to marry for same sex couples: an issue of Margin of Appreciation 
Another topic where judicial fragmentation arose between the ECtHR and the IACtHR is the 
right to marry for same sex couples. The Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR rendered in 
 
2 Handölsdalen v Sweden, Eur.Ct.H.R. (Admissibility), Application no.39013/04 (2010). 
3 Hingitaq 53 v Denmark, Eur.Ct.H.R. (Admissibility), Application no. 18584/04 (2006). 
4 For instance, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.(ser C.) No.79 (Aug. 31, 2001) or Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay.Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser C.) No.125 (Jun 17, 2005). 
November 20175 triggered a clear situation of fragmentation with the ECtHR in relation to 
whether states should provide a right to marry also for same-sex couples.  
The ECtHR has addressed the issue in several cases and has always aligned itself to the position 
of the UN Human Rights Committee and adopted a very cautious position. In Schalk and Kopf 
v Austria and Chapin and Charpentier v France, among others, the ECtHR held that while it 
was a duty of the state to ensure the access to civil partnerships for same-sex couples in order 
to grant them the enjoyment of the right to a family life in the same way as to heterosexual 
couples, the same was not true for the right to marry.6 Noticing that the letter of Article 12 
ECHR provides the right to marry between a man and a woman (and for ‘everyone’ or ‘all 
human beings’ like in other provisions), the European Court established that the Convention 
does not provide a right to marry for same-sex couples. As marriage is an institution deeply 
rooted in local societies, its regulation- and eventual extension to same-sex couples- should be 
left to the single member state, thus granting a Margin of Appreciation (MoA) to state when 
applying such a provision. Moreover, the ECtHR noticed that there was no European consensus 
on gay marriage, being only 6 out of 47 the member states that, at that time, had adopted 
domestic legislation allowing gay marriage.7 In light of that, the MoA granted should be wider.  
This stands in complete opposition to the IACtHR’s approach that established that the right to 
marry should be extended to same-sex couples because ‘there is no legitimate aim that could 
make this distinction [between same-sex and heterosexual couples] necessary and 
proportionate under the Convention’.8 Similar to its European counterpart, also the IACtHR 
looked at the practice of its member states but it clearly stated that the lack of a regional 
consensus could not constitute an obstacle to the advancement of human rights.9 On the 
contrary, in virtue of the conventionality control, all member states are now required to align 
their domestic legislation with the interpretation of the American Convention as provided by 





5 Gender identity, and equality and non-discrimination with regard to same-sex couples. State obligations in 
relation to change of name, gender identity, and rights deriving from a relationship between same-sex. Advisory 
Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser.A) No.24 (Nov 24, 2017) 
6 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, 2010-IV Eur.Ct.H.R. 409 and Chapin and Charpentier v France, 2016-II Eur.Ct.H.R. 
215. 
7 Ibid, 57-60. 
8 Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, 220. 
9 ibid, 219. 
3. Looking at the benches: who are the judges? 
The low engagement with judicial dialogue and a different attitude toward deference and 
subsidiarity between the ECtHR and the IACtHR are some of the adjudication approaches that 
triggered judicial fragmentation between these courts. However, they can be considered as 
motivated also by the identity of the judges who sit in the court and adopt these decisions. 
Looking at the educational and professional background of the current and previous judges that 
sit in the ECtHR and IACtHR, is it possible to observe some trends.10 If one considers the 
number of the current and previous judges of the two courts who received their university 
education outside their continent, the difference is obvious. More than 50% of the current 
judges of the IACtHR received their legal education outside their continent and all of them 
studied in Europe. On the contrary, among the current judges of the ECtHR, only 15% studied 
law outside Europe. The same trend can be found if the totality of the judges is taken into 
consideration, being 51% the IACtHR judges who studied outside the Americas (and all of 
them studied in Europe) and only 6% the ECtHR judges who studied outside Europe. 
Education, and especially university education, significantly influences the reasoning and 
understanding of legal provisions. Undertaking university education in a continent different 
from that of origin may considerably expand the mind of the judge, introducing a completely 
different way to approach legal concepts and adjudication. This may result in endogenous and 
automatic assimilation of another regional perspective on human rights, and a higher likelihood 
of convergence with the human rights perspective of the region where the legal studies have 
been pursued. What we observe in the case of the IACtHR is a potential endogenous 
Europeanisation of its judges that may contribute to the overall convergence between the two 
systems and the constant references from the IACtHR to the case-law of the ECtHR. 
Differently, the ECtHR remains very much closed within its regional mind-setting, having its 
judges had very little exposure, at least in their university background, to other non-European 
legal approaches. This Europeanisation of regional human rights courts is also confirmed by 
the profile of the judges who sit in the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), 
whose 73% received university education outside the African continent and 63% studied in 
Europe.  
Similar trends affect the professional background of regional human rights judges. In 
particular, if one looks at the percentage of judges who served as UN special procedures 
mandate holders or as members of the UN treaty bodies, the different opening of the regional 
 
10 All the following data are based on a study conducted by the author. Further detailed available upon request. 
human rights courts toward a universalistic approach to human rights adjudication is evident. 
14% of the current IACtHR judges served in such positions while the percentage drops to  4% 
in the case of the ECtHR. This data could contribute to further explain the less universalistic 
approach of the ECtHR and, at the same time, the overall convergence of IHRL toward a more 
universalistic interpretation pushed by the IACtHR. 
 
Conclusions 
Judicial fragmentation in IHRL, especially in the case-law of regional human rights bodies, is 
a limited phenomenon. Yet, when it arises, the ECtHR is always one of the terms of 
comparison. The reasons behind the behaviour of the Strasbourg court are mainly internal to 
the court. As shown by the example of the case-law on indigenous property rights and right to 
marry for same sex couples, the lack of judicial dialogue with other human rights courts and a 
considerable use of the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation are key features of the ECtHR 
adjudication and triggered fragmentation with the IACtHR. 
In addition, the two examples presented here show also a different understanding by the ECtHR 
and the IACtHR of their role as supranational courts. The Strasbourg court is, indeed, strongly 
relying on the principle of subsidiarity and granting high degrees of deference to its member 
states, in plain contrast with the IACtHR’s conventionality control doctrine. 
Notwithstanding these differences, judicial fragmentation remains limited also for the lack of 
comparable cases before the different courts since many of the issues adjudicated by the ECtHR 
have not been addressed by any other regional body. New cases before the IACtHR or the 
ACtHPR or new challenges brought to the attention of the ECtHR may trigger further cases of 
fragmentation, exploiting the existing weaknesses and differences between the regional courts. 
However, the bottom-line question remains whether we should aim for convergence in IHRL 
or we should simply accept and welcome fragmentation as a natural step for the development 
of the law and the increasing of human rights standards. 
 
 
